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Dui: i.nq recent vears local scholarship in the f ield of South
Africa's foreiqn policy has tended to focus on the structure of
st «•. t e instituti.ons and on thie personalities of the decision
makevs ., (1 > Wh i 1 st 1 c!o not wish to underp 1 ay the import,anc© o f
m o r i i t o r i n g t hi e t r a n s f o r in a t .1 o n s o c o u r i n g w i t hi i n t he st a t e
apt:• aratus , especia 1 1 y in re 1 at a.on t,a thie mi 1 itari sat ion of thie
top layers of the bureaucracy,, it is nevertheless important to
drf.w away from an emphasis on the model of bureaucratic politics
if one is to do full justice to an understand ing ai South
A f r i c a ' s i. n t e r a c t i C:J n s with o t, h e r s o o i a I f o c m a t i o n s „
Theorising the state has 1 ong been of interest to thiose w.11h a
materialist perspective,, and over the past decade there has been
s hi a r p d e b ate between c a n t e n d i. n q s o h o Q 1 s o f t hi a u g h t - Wit h o u t
re h e arsinq the debates here „ 1 et me simp 1 y menti.on a number of
t h e p r o t a g o n ists: Mil a, b a n d „ P o LA 1 antsas, I.. a c I a u , the "capital
ioqic" school ,, the "state monopoly capital " theorists, and so on „
A number of these debates have been refracted into an analysis of
t h £•-.' S o u t hi A f. r i c a n s t a t e -
Yet those who nave taken it upon themselves to analyse the
£5outH Af r i.can state? in r<s I at,:i-an ta other states have
canipr:ehiensive 1 y iqnoret:;i s»..!ci'l debates ,. 1 n a1.1empti.nq to question
the nature of the South Afrj.cari state., it is na longer adequate
to rely on descriptive treatinents of it as a set ai institutions„
emh)odving nati.ona 1 power. What is reQUi.ved is a serious a11empt
to locate the state in relation to other social forces within the
social formation „ Thie stato' s re 1 at iovish i. p to caqi.t.a 1. , one of
the; key themes within the materialist debates, is not seen by
most write rs on 5ou bhi A i r i <:^a ' s f o re i q i"i i:'elati ons as very
siuni. ficant - Capx ta 1 i.s recjai-ded as one of a ntJmber of i.nterest
qroups, alonq with the church,, the press, the universities and
t h t.? p o 1 i t i c a 1 p a r t i e s .
Clearly, thi.s approach ohscure«• the nature of, the Southi
Af ricart state as beinq a oapitalist state, that is, operatinq
w i % h i n a «; o c i a 1 f o r m a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e d o rn a. n a n b m o d e o f
production is the capitalist mode. The relationship of state to
capital is thus a crucial element of any political analysis of
Sout.'i A£ rica -
It has also become increasingly evident that capital«
particularly in the form of monopoly capital, is not strictly
oonf ined to national boundaries. Capital exports have, from the
time of the last century, played a part in determining the nature
of historical outcomes in numerous social formations,
especially in those with some experience of colonial domination.
The internationalisation of capital provides the context in which
the South African state has developed - South Africa's special
role in the international division of labour, especially with
respect to gold (at least until the break up of the Bretton Woods
system), deserves detailed appraisal in any analysis of its
foreign relations.
But to conflate "international economic relations" with
"foreign policy" is to be a trif le economistic. lvly argument is
that the former is c\n indispensible? subset of the latter- It is
therefore somethina of a dereliction to overlook .the economic
instance, whether it is ultimately determinate or not.
Althouqh the above argument may be fami liar to many, it has
vet to penetrate the realms of the discipiine of "international
relations" as taught within most universities, especially in
•South Africa, where its practice is often too close to the state
C2> or to capital to warrant careful analysis of the relationship
between them. In either case the discipline serves to provide
either government or business with a degree of sophistication in
the conduct of its relations with counterparts or other
institutions abroad.
Yet even in the 1 east instumenta1ist of the recent scho1ar1v
t veatments o f Soutn A i r i ca' s f ore i q n re 1 a11 ons , Deon Ge 1 d enl"i uys,
RAU professor and former research director at the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAI1A)„ allots only five out
of 2BG pages to analysing the relationship of South African-based
capital (. "the business community".* to the foreign policy making
process. His study marks the golden .-jubilee of ar^d is publ ished
for the SA11A , an i nst i tut x on h ea v i 1 y endowecl by the very
b us i n e s s o o m m u n i t y wh i c h h e t r e a t s i n s o c u r is cry a fa s hion. C 3)
The increasing international!sation of South African-based
capital has begun to receive some attention, notably by D E
Kaplan.(40 A specif ic study of the North American holdings of
the Anglo American Corporation conducted by Ruth Kaplan has also
found some echoes in the conclusxc.ro of Duncan Innes's broader
work on the activities of the same corporation„<S) Clearly this
area bea.rs iurther consideration. And since South Africa's
x nternationa1 economi c re1at ions a re recei v i nq 1itt1e attention
f rom its political scientists and foreign policy analysts, we
shalL have to expect further research in this area to originate'
from other quarters.
Where this paper attempts to ii11 qaps is in its exploration
of the relationship between the internationalisation of South
Af rican capital and the foreign pal icy goals of the South Af rican
state. It attempts a contribution to the growing corpus of
knowledge about the direct foreign investment of South African-
based finns. It does so by drawing on specif ic examples of direct
investment in Latin America, more specifically on the cases of
the Anglo American Corporation group in the mining and chemicals
sectors (principally in Brazil), and that
f ishing industry's recent entry into Chile
are preceded by an examination of the role
state in preparing the way for and
investments.
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Guaranteeing the overa11 reproduction of monopoly capital
Despite the consolidation of its political projects, the South
African state found itself, in the final years of the 1960s,
drifting into crisis. The costs to the economy of a high growth
rate between 1963—70 (6,3% on averaqe, second only to Japan) were
related to the policy of import substitution industrialisation as
recommended by the Vi1joen Commission
manufacture consumer goods at home it had
import, vast amounts of capital goods, whose
grew from 30% in 1957 to 45%~in 1970-(7:»
acute balance of payment problems. Ir\ addition, uneven income
distribution meant that the domestic market, could not absorb the
potential output of manufactured goods. South Africa needed new
export markets.
in 1958.(6) To
been necessary to
share of all imports
This gave rise to
Its natural hinterland, Africa, migh-c have provided a way out.
Yet in the 1970s, because of DO 1. itical changes and other factors
 n
there was a sharp decline in the share of South African exports
e n t, erinq o t h e r A i v i c a n c o u n t r i e s . 0 :i: :l: i o i. a 1 statistics indie a t e
that this decline was from around 16%. of all exports in the late
1960s to less than 9% by 1977. These figures presumably
included re-exports t,o Southern Rhodesia.
bulk of South Africa's exports to the rest of
primary products and not manufactured goods.
In any event the
Africa comprised of
This indicates the
failure of the economic underpinning of what, was variously known
as Vorster' s "outward movement1', "di aloaue" and "detente" „
Tne Reynders Commission on the export trade, which reported in
1972 . pref er red a po 1 icy of export-1 eci q rowth . 1.1, ad vised that
"f ram the point of view of export, potential , South Africa
should increase contact, assistance and marketing of its'
goods in respect of certain South American countries...the
empty economies of Latin America must be regarded as natural
markets for South African exports". <. 8)
Along with the crisis of markets went the problem of
diplomatic isolation. Apartheid became, during the 1960s, a
world issue which was raised increasingly by sovereign post-
colonial states at the United Nations and in other international
institutions. The militarisation of South Africa, a process
initiated in the 1960s, and which escalated geometrically in the
following decade, took place against the background of growing
demands for a mandatory UN arms embargo, which was finally
realised in 1977. Even though a number of states refused to
adhere to this, Pretoria experienced increased difficulties in
arms procurement,, It therefore sought to develop a domestic
arms industry and to strengthen its 1 inks with 1ikeminded
regimes such as Israel, Taiwan, the Shah's Iran, and the military
dictatorships in the southern cone of Latin America,(9)
Through these 1 inks, Pretoria hoped to ease her diplomatic
isolation and to forge closer ties with other military
establishments in order to offset the ef fects of the embargo and
to procure armaments where necessary -
But the state faced problems in persuading exporters to
resolve the crisis of markets through a programme oi: trade with
Latin America. In its role as the guarantor of the reproduction
of monopoly capital, it had a clear perception of the overalI
economic interests of the dominant class fraction- Individual
entrepreneurs were slow to realise the potential of their
participation in the strategy which the state favoured„
The Secretary of Commerce, G J J F Steyn, . had cause in
November 1968 to admonish a group of exporters at a seminar
organised by the South Af rican Foreign Trade Organisation CSAFTO)
to promote Latin America as an export markets
"I think you wi11 all agree that the efforts of the
government to foster the development of expanded trade
exchanges between South Af rica and the Latin American
countries wil1 be f ruitless unless the private sector is
prepared to avai1 itself of al1 possible trade opportunities
in those countries created as a result of the government's
recent initiatives in this eirea (see point 1 , below) . If our
exporters are prepared to play their part, and, in
particular, to employ more aggressive marketing methods in
their attempts to increase their share of the supply of
goods and services to Latin American countries, I am
convinced that our excport trade with the Latin American
world will expand appreciably in years to come." CIO)
The state was thus already active in creating incentives to the
stimulation of expanded economic 1 inks.
1• It purchased bonds issued by the Inter American Development
Bank CIDB), enabling South African firms to. tender for any of
the numerous development projects financed by the IDB. This also
entitled the general manager of the parastatal Credit Guarantee
Insurance Corporation of Africa Limited CCGIO to attend the
annual, governors'1 meetings of the IDB.
2. The state offered Latin American governments generous
export credits through the CGIC. The Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) was also involved in financing schemes for
exporters of capital goods. These incentives were important for
maintaining the competitiveness of South Af rican exports on world
markets.
3. The state arranged corporate participation in official
government stands at trade fairs in Latin American capitals. In
the late 1960s these included San Salvador, Lima and Bogota.
Joint SAFTO—CGIC—IDC delegations visited Latin America to discuss
the supply of South African goods and services.
4. The state assisted in the immeasurable improvement of
transport and telecommunications facilities. Air routes to
Brazi1 and Argentina were established, and new shipping 1ines
1 inked South Af rican ports with both the east and west coasts of
South America. Submarine cables and sate 1 lite links enabled
telephonic and other forms of communication to take place with
the efficiency and speed expected in normal commercial practice.
5. The state also stepped up diplomatic contact with Latin
American governments. Numerous officials crossed the Atlantic.
Severa 1 new South Af rican embassies were bui11 in Latin America,
and representation upgraded to residential ambassadorships. The
hiqh point of this pal icy was the visit by the Paraguayan head of
state to this country in April 1974-, which was reciprocated by
the South African prime minister the following year.
There was also a setback to Pretoria: the kidnapping and
assassination of South Afrioa's envoy to El Salvador in 1979. In
the Salvadorean coup of October 1979, the incoming coalition
government broke off all relations with South Africa.
The subsequent instal1 ation of General Dutton as the first
resident ambassador in Chile indicated the close relationship
between the security forces of both states-
6. From 1978, access to foreign exchange for the purposes of
direct foreign investment was eased through the creation of the
f inancial rand and subsequent more 1 iberal measures af. the South
Af rican Reserve Bank »
These various infrastructural developments were to smooth the
path for South AT" rican exporters of manufactured and capital
goods to consider Latin America as an appropriate export
destination. The detaiIs of the new trade relationship have yet
to be researched. However, mere is know about the export of
capital on the part of South African-based firms. It is to the
examination of two such case studies that I now wish to turn.
The Anglo American Corporation in Latin America
Prior to the enormous diversification of the Anglo American
Corporation's empire in the 1970s, it was essentially a mining
finance house based on gold , diamonds and copper in Southern and
Central Af rica. Yet its international entanglements had been
present from the start of its operations in 1917. Not only was
it founded on the basis of foreign capital investment, reflected
in the very name of the corporation, but it was to develop a
monopoly position in the worldwide marketing of diamonds.
Wherever diamonds were discovered, the interests of the Anglo
empire were aroused. The Oppenheimer £amily took an almost
proprietorial interest in diamonds- Founder of Anglo, Sir Ernest
Oppenheimer had started his career on the Kimberley diamond
fields, had risen to the chairmanship of De Beers Consolidated,
had acquired ma.jar holdings in southern Namibia after the South
African conquest, and had set up the Central Se11 ing Organisation
as the marketing arm of Oe Beers and the world diamond industry
as a whole. Anglo executives have • f requent contact with the
Soviet Union, whose diamonds are also marketed by the CSO. Whilst
Harry Oppenheimer, who replaced his father, has now stepped down
as chad, rman of the Anq lo American Corporation, he sti 11 retains
his position as chairman of De Beers.
One of the strategies which the Anglo American Corporation
developed in the early 1970s was that of geographical
diversification, particularly into areas where costs were
substantially lower than those in South Africa. A further
consideration was the potentially volatile political situation in
the Corporation's base country and the long term uncertainty over
South Africa's future. Harry Oppenheimer, then still chairman,
had long been associated with liberalism and advocated the need
for social transformation as the best guarantor of the survival
of monopoly capital in South Af rica.. Yet because the pace of
chanqe was negligible, the Corporation's .judgement was that the
further the risks could be spread, the better.
A number of factors were instrumental in Anglo's serious
consideration of a Brazi1ian investment. The need to maintain a
global monopoly in controlling the diamond market was one such
factor. Therefore Anglo., through De Beers, had an automatic
interest in securing an interest in any significant new diamond
finds. In the case of Brazil, prospecting in the late 1960s was
beginning to bear fruit in the early seventies. The military
regime which took over the country in 1964 was also keen to
stimulate foreign investment in the minerals sector.
To maintain the support of the indigenous bourgeoisie, the
mi i. itary government was loath to al low majority ownership by
foreign-based companies. But in many cases local capitalists were
unable to raise suf£icient f inance to expand operations; in other
cases external participation was seen as a useful way of
acquiring advanced technology.
The main incentive for Anglo's entry into Brazil was a clear
approach received by a Brazilian industrialist for participation
in a diamond prospecting company. Prior to the Kimberley
discoveries in the 1860s, Brazil had been the major source of the
world's diamonds ranging back to the eighteenth century-
Production had all but ceased by the time of the Kimberley
discoveries, but changes in technology supported new
possibilities for the economic viability of Brazilian alluvial
diamonds in the late twentieth century.
To sustain its monopoly on the world market, the Brazilian
offer was one which could not be refused - It came from an
entrepreneur, Agosto Azevedo Antunes, Brazil's leading private
mining financier. Dr Antunes, trained as a mining engineer, had
previously been engaged in joint ventures with large US metals
and mining corporations such as Bethlehem Steel and Hanna Mining.
His approach to Anglo was sufficiently interesting for the
corporation, since it reasoned that the deal would give it a
foothold in Brazil and access to local expertise in the legal,
financial and f iscal spheres.
Further, Brazil seemed an attractive destination for
new investment compared to some of the other possibilities under
consideration at the time- Restrictive measures in the USA,
Australia (then under the Whitlam government) and Canada, coupled
with the dif f iculties experienced in Af rica« caused Anglo to
regard . Brazil with relative optimism. Wages were low, taxes
moderate, after-tax profits repatriable and, unlike in Africa,
there was a pool of labour with the requisite mining ski 1 Is. An
Anglo executive also pointed to the relative political stability
in Brazi1 after 1964, expressing the view that 1973 marked the
'' peak cf the Revo.1 ution C i.e. mi .1 itary ru 1 e > in terms of contro 1
of inflation" (11)
Yet the factor which clinched Anglo's entry into Brazil was
ultimately the opportunity it obtained to purchase existing and
potential gold mines.
One of the constraints under which the world gold mining
industry operated in the middle third of the century (1934-69)
was the constant price of gold, establ. ished at US$35 A\-\ ounce on
the world market- With the rise in fixed costs and the rapid
inflation of the latter half of the 1960s, South Africa's gold
mininq industry was flung into crisis. Forecasters anticipated
that the industry miqht col lapse entirely during the 1970s, if
the world price for gold remained .intact.
aAs one of the principal mining finance houses and as the owner
and operator of numerous gold mines in South Af rica, many of
which were low-grade producers and hence under risk , Anglo felt
the imperative to diversify its holdings geographically. Given
the f iscal restrictions operating elsewhere, and the welcome
provided to transnational on the part of its government, Brazil
was no longer worth ignoring. Interesting investment
possibilities were soon to reveal themselves.
Thus after a detailed six month feasibility study, focusing on
the technical financial and legal dimensions of a potential
investment, in 1973 the Corporation established a subsidiary in
Rio de Janeiro, the Anglo American Corporation do Brasil -
Administracao, Participacao e Comercio em Empreendimentos
Mineiros - Limitada, known familiarly as Ambras. This was to
become the holding group for most of the Anglo group's Brazilian
assets.
Anglo sought to gain maximum advantage f rom the Brazilian
government's partiality to denationalising the country's mining
sector. It also took advantage of the fact that Portuguese
nationals were allowed the same rights as Brazilian citizens to
act commercially, and placed Dr Mario Ferreira, a Portuguese
citizen, in the chairmanship of Ambras. Ferreira had previously
headed Anglo's operations in colonial Mozambique, when the
Corporation formed part of an international consortium to
construct the Cahcra Bassa dam on the Zambezi river in the late
1960s. At the time the pro.ject was criticised for forming part of
a strategic settlement scheme promoted by the Portuguese colonial
government to attract white immigrants. Ferreira was also
reputed to have close links with Jorqe Jardim, a Portuguese
businessman involved in breaking oi1 sanctions against the Smith
government and who later helped finance the radio station of the
anti-Frelimo MNR movement.
Preoccupied with gold and diamonds, Ambras showed Bn interest
in prospection and the? acquisition of mining investments. At the
time, Brazi1's gold mining industry was in the doldrums. The
major mine, Morro Velho, located about 32S km due north of Rio at
Nova Lima, close to the city of Belc Horizonte, had experienced a
turbulent history under British control between 1830 and I960,
C12) after which it was acquired by three Brazilians for the
token sum of one dollar.
Despite government subsidies, the constant qold price of the
•1960s made substantial investment in the mine prohibitive for the
Brazilian owners. Productivity declined rapidly, the technology
was backward, and the local press exposed the dangerous and
unhealthy working conditions. By 1968 a former Morro Velho
superintendent declared that 'in the four years necessary for its
reconstruction, the mine has virtually been paralysed
economically and it is humanly impossible to continue to work it'
(13) .
Thus it was that the Brazi1ian owners invited Anq lo to
purchase a 49% minority holding. Here was a chance to utilise
Anglo's economic expertise, vast access to capital and
anKiousness to diversify qeoqraphxcally out of South Af rica.
Morro Velho, the deepest mine in all of Latin America (2-450m),
might benefit from Anglo's considerable deep-level experience on
the Witwatersrand-
Despite the backing of Mario Henrique Simonsen, Brazil's
finance minister, and who later became Anglo's major Brazilian
partner, government enthusiasm towards Anqlo's entry into Brazi1
was tempered with apprehension on the part of a number of
politicians.
Two parliamentary commissions of enquiry were established in
the Chamber of Deputies at this time. One sought to examine
Brazil's minerals policy and the other the role ai foreign
capital in the country - C14) Each had the competence to examine
the Morro Velho deal, and the commission on minerals summoned one
of its former Brazilian owners to qive evidence. Unfortunately
for the historian, the key parts of his deposition which dealt
specifically with the deal have been excised from the final
published report, perhaps in error• No serious critique of the
deal resulted, despite the intentions of some of the commission's
mare nationalist deputies to limit foreign acquisition ai
Brazi1ian mineral resources-
In a similar manner, despite close questioning of witnesses,
the commission on multinationals failed to tackle fully the
question of the entry of South African capital into Brazil.
The Minister of Mines and Energy„ Shiqeaki Ueki, was cross-
examined on the deal, putting forward the technological
imperative as an argument for accepting the new South African
presence:
"If s really only Anglo American which has the best knowhow
for exploiting gold at this depth-..so this Brazilian group
thought that this association ('.with Anglo) was convenient.
We hope that, with this association, gold production wi11
increase. The deal was signed a year ago (in 1975). I
believe that the Brazilxan group made the deal on excel lent
terms, because qold has since dropped in price from 200 to
130 dollars." C15>
Ueki's evidenceo instead of being challenqed, was entered
piecemeal into the f inal report of the-commission as part of the
chairperson's summary., as if it were the considered opinion of
the entire commission- No restrictions were placed on Anqlo's
investments.
Why was this the case? Firstly,- substantial xqnoranee existed
in Brazil at the time about the nature of Anqlo American and its
role in the South African and other national economies.
Deputies, although critical, deferred easily to the technological
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pretext for approving the admission of Anglo into the most
promising areas of Brazilian mining, failing to consider the
political implications- Secondly, Anglo's public relations
machine had excelled itself. A team of top executives visited
Brazil, meeting with' senior cabinet ministers such as Simonsen,
Delfim Neto, and Pias Leite. The editors of the influential Rio
newspapers Jornal do Brasil and 0 Globo (the latter being
connected to the largest television network in the country) were
lavishly entertained. Anglo's diamond partner, Antunes, had been
helpful in smoothing the way such that overt opposition to
Anglo's entry was not met.
But the coup de grace was Harry Oppenheimer's reception by
President Ernesto Geisel. In the context of an authoritarian
military state, this signified the automatic official acceptance
of the Morro Velho deal• Ironically„ whi1st Oppenheimer, a
direct representative of South African monopoly capital, was able
to qain access to the president, it is doubtful whether Geisel
would have received any senior apartheid politician. At the time
he was pursuing a foreign policy which favoured close relations
with African states and a posture hostile to apartheid.
The deal whereby Anglo bought into MineracpSo Morro Velho was
to form the springboard for further Anglo investments in Brazil.
Anglo also acquired a vast expanse of land in the interior of the
north-eastern state of Bahia, close to the town of Jacobina, 1300
km from Rio. This holdinq., rich in gold, was later consolidated
into the Morro Velho company. Capital has been thrust into both
mining investments, and will amount to a projected total of
US*306,S-m. by the? end of 1988= ' Of this figure *70-m. has
a 1 ready been spent on the Jacobina mine, and *197,5—m. is
earmarked for the extention of the Morro Velho project to the
nearby Cuiaba-Raposos mines. These f igures were announced by
Morro Velho's superintendent at a mining industry conference in
May 1983.(16) It is likely that the overall total of investment
may exceed these projected figures, since in July 1984 Anglo
announced that the f irst phase had cost $161-m., exceedinq the
superintendent's figures by $62,8-m. or 39 per cent.
The relationship between Anglo aod the Bozana Simonsen group
has proved important to the Corporation. The link arises from
the close friendship between Ambras president Mario Ferreira and
Jdilio Bozano. Bo z ana' s partner, Mario Henrique Simonsen, a former
f inanoe and p1anning m in i sbe r, reoeived a glowinq t r i bute i n
Anqlo's house journal. (17) The Corporation began to announce
in its Annual Reports aM increasing shareholding in the Bozano
Simonsen bank as wel1 as in its industrial holding group.
Dividends amounted to US$0,7-m. (March 1982), *1,6-m- (March
1983) and *1,9-m. (March 1984)-
Ambras also acquired 49% of Companhia Sider6rgica Hime SA,
a steel company belonging to the Bozano Simonsen group, in March
1980. The ostensible aim of this acquisition was to extend
.Anqlo's investments into the metalworking field and to have a
research base for prospecting non-ferrous metals. But Hime also
possessed 1% of Morra v"elho, and in the same year, bought out
Moreira Salles' Cia. Valenca de ParticipaoGes, which possessed
the remaining 50% of the capital of Morro Velho-
1 ^ Ownershig °£ SAj_ 1980
Grupo Bo2ana Simonsen : : Anglo American Corp do Brasil
51 % B : 49 %
: Cia- Siderurgica Hime :•
•
: 100 %
Cia Valenca de Participates 1 % 49 %
50 % : MORRO VELHO
The new ownership pattern reinforced Anglo's control over
Morro Velho, owning 49% directly and a further 25% <49% of 51%)
indirectly, amounting to 74% in total - The Bozana Simonsen
group's holding was reduced to 26% <S1% of 51%). Valenca was
subsequently absorbed and ceased to exist.
in ef feet amounting to
Bazano Simonsen-Angla
ownership even further.
Morro Velho company was
expenditure on basic
Practical objections to this situation,
full denationalisation, have forced the
partnership to disguise the nature of the
In November 1982 it was reported tha.t the
seeking finance covering 60% of its
engineering, technology and equipment purchases fram the Ninas
Gerais State Development Bank (BDMG), FINAME Can agency of the
National Bank for Social and Economic Development) and FINEP
(Finance for Studies and Projects, part of the planning
ministry). The announcement was swiftly denied by FINER, which
claimed that on 14 October 1982, it unanimously rejected the
company's application because BDMG had pointed out that although
51% of Morro Velho's capital was owned by Brazilian nationals,
nevertheless effective control of the company was in the hands of
a foreign corporation. On these grounds Morro Velho was refused
official f inancinq.
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The company's ownership structure has undergone some changes
in order for it to appear to be, at least on paper, more
obviously under national control. The present structure appears
to reduce -Anglo's holdings even further, but cross-holdings
amount to a paper percentage of 45.4%. This leaves out of account
the fact that Anglo's holding company in the Americas, Minorca,
thrauqh other subsidiaries in Liberia, owns significant and
growing percentages of the Bozano Simonsen group and its bank.
Diagram Zi. Qwnershig of MineraG,£g Mgrrg Vel.bg SA^ late 1982
Anglo American
Corp do Brasil
•19 % 81 %
Gestio
Grupo Bozano
Simonsen
51 % : 49 %
s Sider6rgica Hime
: 12 % SB %
MineracpSto MORRO VELHO SA
Working conditions on Anqlo-run mines have come under great
criticism in Brazil. In Jacobina, the miners complain about
dangerous working conditions, bad transport and inadequate food.
no danger pay or social
with overtime (normal
receive just over the
The company, according
to cover up the cause
security supplement. Waqes are
shifts last 10 hours) the 800
minimum wage of around $50 per
to testimonies of workers, has
of a worker's death in a mining
There is
low and
workers
month.
attempted
accident in order to avoid having to compensate the family. The
company has also threatened workers with dismissal for attempting
to form an association. <18)
At Morro Velho average wages are between two and three minimum
salaries (between $90 and $140 per month) depending on overtime
worked- Because of the deep level of the oldest part of the
mine, there are substantial refrigeration problems. Very high
temperatures force the miners to work in shorts and sandals and
with scarves over their faces instead of protective headgear.
Because of the drilling, fine silicon dust enters both through
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the* respiratory system and through the unclad pores of the skin.
The1 high incidence of si 1icasis (one in three workers are
afiected according to union officials) testifies to the poor
working conditions. The company has closed down its hospital and
workers depend on their union and inadequate state provision far
medical services. Although a company town, the mayor, himself a
doctor, claims that the company has failed to assist the
municipality with any social service payments. He alleged that
none of the taxes payed by the company reach the
municipality.(19) Social responsibility for the poverty of the
community of Nova Lima, dependent on mine incomes since the last
century, must lie to a large extent with the company.
From official statistics it is evident that the tiorro Velho
group is by far the most important source of underground gold in
Brazil, providing 97% of total underground production in 1981.
Until 1979, underground production was far greater than opencast
and alluvial production, but this pattern has changed
substantially since then.
: BRAZILIAN GOLD
: Year
: 1978
.
 1 9 7 9
: 1980
: 1981
: 1982
Total
8,6
4,3
13, S
24,1
33,8
PRODUCTION,
Morro Velho
3,8
3,1
4,0
4,2
4,2
1978-1982 (metric tonnes) :
Opencast/Alluvial
4,5
0,9
9,6
19,7 •
29,3
Other :
0,3 :
0,3 :
0,2 :
0,2 :
0,3 :
Source: Brazi1, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Departamento
Nacional tie ProducSlo Mineral , statistics issued to the Instituto
Brasi leiro de Mineracpao, Be la Horizonte. (The Anglo American
Corporation 1984 Annual Report announced that MMV qold production
amounted to 5 t for the year 1983.) .
Nevertheless whi1st Morro Velho has declined in relative
importance, the question of gold has become strategically crucial
to the Brazilian economy, whose national debt approaches US$100
billion. The escalation of gold production is a key element in
paying off the debt. Eaqer to acquire as much qold as possible,
the Brazilian government is offering producers a higher price
than is obtainable an the world market. There is also
substantial interest in the establishment of a national gold
regulating authority, Ourobras, with the matter being raised in
the Senate by Gabriel Hermes, chairman of the Committee on Mines
and Enerqy, as well as in the paqes of the national press. (20)
The tenor of this debate is critical of any foreign participation
and control over gold production. Both these factors are likely
to constrain Anglo expansion into further areas of . gold
production.
Because of this, Anglo has tended to spread its investments
into other areas of mining and industry, as- well as the banking
field mentioned earlier- Through its De Beers subsidiary AECI,
it has acquired interests in a number of explosives companies in
Brazil. Its Brazilian partners in this venture used to have
formal associations with one of Salazarist Portugal's finance
ministers. Prof» Texeira Pinto, responsible for advising the
Champalimaud family on their investments in Mozambique. Although
public links with Texeira Pinto are no longer acknowledged,
AECI's Brazilian partners are backed by a mysterious Swiss
company, Dex Holdings, which experts believe is a cover for
Teneira Pinto, who transferred his investments out of Portugal
before they could be nationalised in the wake of the 1974
revolution.
One of the explosives factories owned by the joint venture is
called Companhiia de Explosivos Valparaiba - CEV. According to the
Brazilian specialist defence press, CEV, based at Lorena in the
state of SSo Paulo, supplies the Brazi1ian armed forces and
numerous export customers with 'various types of hand grenades,
smoke grenades, smoke markers, smoke gas grenades for anti-riot
use, fuses for various types of heavy ammunition, rockets for
bazooka-type launchers, aircraft rockets of different types' as
well as the Ml submachxnequn, soon to be launched.(21) CEV uses the
logic of 'security reasons' to avoid divulging the names of
countries to whom it seiIs its products
 o
Neither Anglo nor AECI have ever made mention of their
participation in the Brazilian explosives industry* in their
annual reports. Shareholders are kept ignorant of the workings
of the partnership, IBEX Participates SA, which had a capital of
1.4 bi 11 ion cruzeiros at the ^\io of 1982, according to
documentation deposited with the Junta Comercial under Rio de
Janeiro state law. Angla's involvement in the lucrative
Brazilian arms export industry raises numerous sensitive
questions about the Corportion's image? and activities.
Further inroads into the Brazilian mining industry were made
in December 1981, when Anglo and its associates purchased a 40%
interest in Empresas Sudamericanas Consolidadas SA, the holding
company far all the South American assets of the Panama-based
Hochschild group. . Through this deal Anqlo extended its Latin
American holdings to Peru, Chile and Argentina and has set up its
own subsidiary companies in Buenos Aires and Santiago. In Brazil
itself the deal enabled Anqlo to increase its holding in the
CO0EMIN ferro-nickel project in the state of Goias to over 3B%.
Empresas also has investments in niobium and tungsten production
and the manufacturing of industrial furnaces. During 1982 it
acquired a 69,7% interestin Copebras, a major Brazi. 1ian producer
of fertilisers, industrial phosphates and gypsum. By April 1983
this stake had been raised to 73%, and in December of the? same
year the company absorbed Fosfago, another phosphate producer. It
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is relevant that Brazil's major import from South Africa in the
early 1980s was phosphoric and ortho-phosphoric acid.
Other non-mining investments include Ambras' majority (57,8%)
holding in the Iracema cashew nut processing company in
Fortaleza, the state capital of Ceara. This investment is not so
curious as it appears, since Anglo possessed substantial
investments in the Mozambican cashew industry, whose shares it
stil1 owns. The transfer of management and technical expertise
suited the corporation. In 1982 Iracema exported 350 tonnes of
cashew products worth US$1 ,45-m. to South Af rica. In its annual
report for the same year, Anglo noted a $250,000 dividend from
Iracema avid the repayment of $1,9-01. of the company' s foreign
debts. 1983 profits leapt to $1 ,l-m» Iracema"1 s products are
available in both Brazilian and South African supermarkets-
More recently, in November 1983, De Beers do Brasi1 started
operating its Brasilian industrial diamonds division in Sao Paulo
with the object of marketing its product in the country's
.Industrie 1 heartland. It intends
 4 according to the company
president Jorge Saloma Minquel1 , to market a mil lion carats and
tio a turnover of US$2-m. during 1984.. By the time of its
official inauguration at the end of January 1984, it had already
acquired a market share of 50 per cent. <22)
Ang lo is keen to maintain and extend its Brazilian
involvement. In a short period of time it has developed into one
of the key mining groups in Brazil, with substantial holdings and
diversif ied interests. By 1962 it had become the largest foreign
holder of prospecting riqhts in Brazil, preceded only by the two
large state-owned mining companies. C23) It has provided
technical inputs, rescuing the moribund gold mines of Morro
Veiho, brinqinq them back to former high levels of production and
investinq in the opening of various new mines, It has 1 inked its
operations to the powerful Bozano . Simonsen group and other
multinationals such as Hochschild, Schenk and Banque de
1'Indochine. By doing so it has secured a permanent and
strategic role for itself in the Brazi1ian economy„ and ensured
the durability of South Africa's commercial connections with
Brazil.
\?J n
Overseas net prof its
Fishing is a predatory industry, somewhat akin to hunting. It
is also an industry subject to rapidly osci1 I ating business
cycles- As such it involves high risks and occasionaliy very
hiqh profits. In South Africa the industry is highly monopolised,
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with half a dozen major fishing corporations (forming a shifting
cartel) and a small number of more modest-sized independent
companies. Monopolisation means that there are prohibitive costs
involved for view companies attempting to enter the industry.
Some of the larger fishing groups are subsidiaries of even larger
more diversified food sector companies. Marine Products, for
example is part of Fedfood in the Federale Volksbeleggings
stable. The Ovenstone holdings have become increasingly under
the control of Premier, the food/retai1 group of which Anglo has
a substantial share. Other companies which have their origins in
family f irms, such as Willem Barendz and Kaap-Kunene, have not
yet been acquired by the giant corporations.
The f ishing corporations have their headquarters in Cape Town,
and operate fleets and processing plants along the west coast as
far north as Walvis Bay- Until the 1980s the Namibian fishing
grounds ranked amongst the most lucrative in the world. They
attracted fleets not only from South Africa, but from Eastern and
Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Iraq and Cuba. In
1976 the fishing resource began to col lapse, owing to overf ishing
and the killing off of plankton due to unusually cold water
temperatures. A reduction in quotas control 1 ing the amount of
fish caught was applied to the fishing corporations. The quota
on pilchards fell to zero by 1981, and the 1982 quota was filled
within two months of the opening of the pilchard season. (24)
A number of the corporations had to develop strategies of
survival. Gome, like Ovenstones, diversified into manufacturing
and construction. Yet this strategy did not resolve the problem
of idle capital beinq tied up. The companies had been left with
redundant fleets, canneries
 H processing plants avid warehouses in
Walvis Bay and Luderitz. Some companies joined forces in order to
rationalise their assets in Walvis Bay (for example Ovenstone and
General Development Corporation)- Other solutions were to put
factories into mothballs, or to transfer plant to other
instal1ations. A third solution to the Namibian crisis was to
establish subsidiaries abroad.
Certain fishing executives were interviewed as to the choices
of available investment destinations^ Australia was rejected due
to its high-tax regime and hosti J. ity to South African investment,
Britain due to perceptions at a militant trade union movement,
and Argentina owing to the 'chaos and instabi1ity' prevalent
around the time of the fall of Isabel Per6n. Ovenstone had
encountered problems in attempting to sel1 its f ishinq factory-
ship to an Argentine group. Peru had decided to nationalise its
f ishing fleet, thus there were no openings there for capital
investment.
The ideal choice for most companies was Chile. Firstly, there
had been a historical precedent, in that the Ovenstone group
participated in a joint venture with a Chi lean company over
twenty years ago. In July 1963 a factory was established at
Xquique to process 50 tons of f ish a\i hour. Most of the
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machinery and equipment for the was manufactured in South Africa,
and Ovenstone supplied the technical staff for its construction
and for training local workers- South Africans were also brought
in to run the smal1 fishing fleet.<2B) The Ovenstones were
appointed honorary Consuls for Chile in Cape Town.
Yet from 1970 there were changes afoot in Chile. The Ovenstone
holdings- in Chile were nationalised by the Popular Unity
government and their former fleet was merged into the state
fishing corporation. Once the AIlende government had been
toppled, however, the military .junta invited the Ovenstones to
resume their fishing activities in Chile and to increase their
investment if they so wished. Ovenstones took up this offer in
1979, shipping a cannery partly to Iquique and partly to
Talcahuano.
Secondly, Chile offered South African investors a favourable
investment environment. Unlike other choices, Chile's firm
mi 1itary government had seen to it that there were no
inconvenient trade unions demanding high wages or cushy working
conditions. The economic nationalism of the Allende period was
put aside, and Chile made it easy for foreign firms to obtain
local investment finance. The tax regime was favourable,
allowing foreign corporations to choose their own level of
taxation with only two possibilities for minor upward revision.
Profits will be allowed to be repatriated subject to a relatively
low tax of 30%H although at present they wil1 be used for loan
repayment, reinvestment and of fsetting of lasses. C26>
Thirdly, Chile's relations with South Africa have been stepped
up gradually over the past decade- At first Pinochet attempted
to distance himself from contacts with Pretoria in order to
create a qood impression at the UN and offset the ."junta's
isolation. However this tactic failed, and an approximation to
South At rica was made precisely because of the junta's continued
isolation. Diplomatic relations were raised to ambassadorial
level and, as mentioned earlier, Pretoria dispatched one of its
top milxtary men, Lieutenant—General Jack Dutton, as its f i rst
resident ambassador in Santiago in 1981 - (27) Prior to this the
envoy to1Argentina had also been accredited to Chile.
General Dutton had previously been Chief of Staf f
(Operations), the number two position in the South Af rican
Defence Force- He had also been an ideologue for what became
known as the Total Strategy. C28> Within South Africa, his
appointment to Santiago was regarded as something of a sideways
promotion, to eliminate him from any further rise to power at GHQ
- apparent 1Y a common way o:f: dealing with ambitious Anglophones.
0utsicle South Africa, the appointment drew a11ention to the cJ.ose
military .links between the two states.
According to the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, South Af rica had sold Chile twelve Cactus surface-to-air
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missiles, equivalent to the French Crotale system produced
locally under licence. (29) Close naval links were manifested in
the visits of the four-masted barquentine Esmeralda, normally
used as a training ship. In 1973, immediately after the coup,
this vessel had been used for the internment and alleged torture
of sailors loyal to the Popular Unity government. In 1981 its
visit coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the Republic.
Chilean sailors and midshipmen goose-stepped' through the streets
of Durban in the of ficial mi 1itary parade, and visitors to the
ship included Mrs Botha who "was visibly moved when the crew sang
Die Stem" in Afrikaans. (30)
Given this context, the South African fishing companies found
a warm welcome in Chile.
Ovenstones' return in 1979 prompted other companies to
consider investments in Chile. A deal was stuck between Fed food
(the parent company of Marine Products!) and another fishing group
Kaap-Kunene, whereby R6 mill ion would be committed to a /joint
venture with a Chi lean f ishing company, Empresa Pesquera
Tarapaca. Investments were made in a cannery at Iquique,
Pesquera del Norte, and a fish meal concern, Pesquera Caldera, at
Caldera itself, which received dismantled reduction plant
equioment from the General Development Corporation at Luderitz.
Trawlers were also sent from Namibia to supplement the fleet at
Caldera. However this investment has run into trouble owing to
the f inancial difficulties of the Chi lean partner and the general
conditions of recession in Chile. Although the canning plant has
begun to operate, the fish meal project at Caldera had to be
delayed - About Rl mil lion had to be set aside in 1982 to cover
anticipated losses. (31)
The same Chilean partner, Hmnberto Camelio, also struck up a
deal with a consortium known as United Fishing Enterprises. This
is made up of three shareholders, Swaf.il , Seaswa (Oceana group) ,
and Sarubar (jointly run by Sarusas and Willem Barendsz). With
the bankruptcy of Camel io, Seaswa a.y~\d U)i 1 lem Barendsz moved in to
acquire the Chilean assets, such that the company, Pesquera
Coquimbo, is now wholly South African-owned. Coquimbo is the
site of a cannery and reduction (fish meal and oi1 processing)
plant, shipped from Walvis Bay. and installed during 1980-81. Thre
1983 Oceana annual report stated that the company was not
anticipating further operating lasses but that R220.000 was being
set aside to cover passible exchange losses on the outstanding
foreign loan. This loan was contracted to assist with the
purchase of the company s share of Camelio's assets. In fact this
prediction was confirmed in 1984, when the venture showed a
profit for the first time (of UB$l--m. ) . (32)
Ovenstone's interests in Chile include Pesquera Playa Blanca
in Caldera, control led through its UK-based firm L'Interpeche.
Playa Blanca exports fish-meal to EEC countries, mainly UK and
Italy- In addition Ovenstone has a 10% interest in Pesquera
Iquique, reputedly the world's largest pelagic fishinq company.
In 1983 Ovenstone's operating profits in Chile increased by 47%,
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but it is unlikely to grow at the same pace in 1984. Yet
Ovenstone's annual report in 1984 termed the Chilean investments
"very exciting".
All in all, the total commitment of South African fishinq
corporations in Chile has been estimated at between R25-30—m-, a
f iqure "far exceeding total recent reinvestment in Namibia". (.763)
The canned f ish and fish meal is sold on the world market and
much of it finds its way to South Africa, such that a new
shipping line was initiated in March 1982 to cover the Peru-
Chile-South Af rica route. Peru provides the largest quantities,
and the canned f ish products are imported through the industry's
sole marketing agency Federal Marine, jointly owned by the
fishing companies themselves. Imports began in 1978 after
domestic production had fallen below public demand. Federal
Marine sent quality control personnel to Peru and Chile to
upgrade production and packing to South African standards. In
Peru this was later formalised when Federal Marine set up a
company staffed by nationals of Peru; in Chile South African are
still in supervisory roles. (34!)
The Peruvian fish canning industry at Chimbote was recently
exposed in the world press for its scandalous working conditions
by Or Jenny Amery of the Catholic Institute for International
Relations, who works on a health project in the shanty towns
surrounding the town. (35)
The boom in the industry has drawn people to Chimbote's 30
canning plants at such a rate that the small port of 5
 n 000 people
in 1940 has grown to an urban slum of 300.000. The canneries
employ mostly women workers €80%) who are paid less than men, are
less aware of their riqhts, less organised and easier to exploit.
Almost all are casual workers, have unstable shifts and
compulsory overtime, earning around R2 a day (.1 .450 soles)
regardless of the shift's duration. The factories do not comply
with health standards and there is no protective clothing, so
that hands are exposed to knife wounds and fish spines during
quttinq, as wel1 as painful burning for those packinq pilchards
in hot chilIi sauce. Women have begun to organise themselves in
a Union of Cannery Workers and are beginning to articulate
demands for better paid and healthier work. (36)
The chain from fish to table is one which involves the labour
of thousands of people., not simply in our own country, but
increasingly from all aver the world - A decision to relocate
production in other countries has a devastating effect upon
local fishinq communities and processing workers™ But this also
applies to the workers in the fishinq factories of Peru where
minimum wages are inadequate and health and safety legislation is.
scantily enforced. The South African companies involved in buying
cheap Peruvian tinned fish and fish meal for resale in South
Af rica and Europe do not have any impetus to ensure that these
workers receive livinq wages or that elementary health and safety.
cpnditions are met during production. Conditions in Chimbote
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would be very familiar to low paid food industry workers in South
Africa.
This analysis has concentrated on two major South African
investments in Latin America, that of the Anglo American
Corporation, mainly in Brazil, and that of the fishing industry,
mainly in Chile. it has attempted to place these investments in
their political and social contexts.
South Af rica's entry into Latin America was largely motivated
by state policy, creating the conditions for future commercial
opportunity. Much of the policy was designed by and linked with
former foreign minister Hilgard Muller. Since his departure from
the portfolio, there has been a reduction in the emphasis on the
importance of developing these relations. Yet there have also
been real constraints operating on bath sides.
For South Africa's part, the emphasis of official foreign
policy formation has shifted, of necessity, to a preoccupation
with the immediate Southern African region. Organisationally,
the Department of Foreign Affairs has introduced structural
changes and has established an entire section to deal with the
immediate region. Strategic issues have come to outweigh
considerations of trade and foreign exchange balances. Latin
America is stil J. regarded, however, as a useful trading area, and
a potential source for the procurement of armaments. The setting
up of a Centre for Latin American Studies at the University of
South Af rica in August 1984, funded from the parliamentary vote
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, should be seen in this
context.
As for the Latin American countries, their attitude to South
Africa varies considerably. In recent years, Mexico, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Colombia, and Venezuela have broken diplomatic or
commercial relations with Pretoria. " Arqentina and Bolivia have
both reverted to civilian rule and are likely to take a less
favourable attitude towards the apartheid state. In particular,
Argentina has taken a dim view of South African logistical
support for the construction by Britain of a mi 1itary airport at
Port Stanley, and of South Africa's acceptance of the credentials
of the torturers Chamorro and Astis as miItary attaches for
Argentina. In Brazil's case the evenhanded commercial
relationship will continue despite some African objections, but
on a cultural and diplomatic level relations will continue to be
scaled down. Much wil1 depend on the shape of the presidential
contest in 1985; if this takes the form of a direct election, the
first civilian president since 1964 would be likely to adopt a
firmer . anti-apartheid posture than any of his mi 1itary
predecessors,
These constraints on the development of political relations
seem not to affect the continued expansion of an economic
presence for South African corporations which regard Latin
America as a challenging new area for prof it-taking.
References
1
E du Plessis, Die buitelandse beleid van dr H F Verwoerd
(1958-66), M A dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1978.
Deon Geldenhuys, The diplomacy of isolation: South African
foreign policy making, Johannesburg: liacmilIan for the South
African Institute of International Affairs, 1984.
Marie Eloi'se Mul ler, Suid-af rika se buitelandse
verteenwoordiging (1910—72), Pretoria: van Schaik, 1976.
G C Olivier, Suid-afrika se buitelandse beleid, Pretoria:
Academica, 1977.
This list excludes many published articles.
For example G C Olivier, professor of politics and
international relations at the University of Pretoria, was
seconded to the Department of Foreign Af fairs for a two-year
period f rom August 1983.
3
Geldenhuys, op. cit., pp. 160-165, which mainly describes
the role of business associations in relation to government.
4
D E Kaplan, "The internationalisation of South African
capital: South Af rican direct foreiqn investment in the
contemporary period", African Affairs, July 1983.
D E Kaplan, "South Africa's changing place in the world
economy", in Georqina Jaf fee (ed), South Af rican Review I,
Johannesburg: Ravan, 1983.
The same author's contribution to Work in Progress 16,
February 1981, contains some pertinent related observations.
5
Ruth Kaplan, Anglo American Corporation of South Africa
Limited investments in North America, paper presented to UNCOA
conference, Vienna, 1982 (mimeo>.
Duncan Innes, Anglo American and the rise of modern South
Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984.
6
Union of South Af rican Report of the commission of enquiry
into policy relating to the protection of industries, UG36/1958,
Pretoria: Government Printer, 1958.
22
 N
7
Official statistics. Compare with Table 12.10 in Martin
Fransman, "Capital accumulation in South Africa"n in Martin
Pransman <ed> * Industry and accumulation in Africa, London:
Heine?mann, 1982, pq. 249 -
8
Republic of South Af rica, Reports of the commission of
inquiry into the export trade, 2 volumes, RP69/1972, Pretoria:
Government Printer, 1972, pg. 166.
9
Rightist military regimes took power in Paraguay in 1954,
Brar.il in 1964, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, and Argentina between
1966-72 and 1976-83o
10
G J J F Steyn, Address by the Secretary of Commerce at a
luncheon given by the South Africon Foreign Trade Organisation on
the occasion of a seminar on the Latin American market,
Johannesburg, 25 November 1968, Pretoria: Department of
Information, 1968 (mimeo).
11
Interview, Johannesburg, 1 February 1984.
12
On the history of Morro Velho, see:
Marshal 1 Eakin, Nova Lima: life labour and technology in
an Anglo-Brazilian mining community, 1882-1934, History Ph D „
University of California, Los Angeles, 1982;
Douglas C Libby, 0 trabalho escravo na mina de Morro
Velho, tese de mestrado, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais,
Belo Horizonte, 1979;
and the excel lent account of worker organisation researched
under conditions of qreat danger:
Yonne de Sousa Grossi, Mina de Morro Velho: a extraqsa'o do
homem, uma hist6ria de experiencia operaria, Rio de Janeiro: Paz
e Terra, 1981. I am grateful to Professora Grossi for kindly
sharing many of her research experiences and contacts.
13
Guido Jacques Penido addressing the XXth Week of Mining
and Metallurqy Studies, September 1968, quoted in Sergio Danilo,
"A venda da mina de Morro Velho", OpiniSo, 11 April 1975, pq. 9-
14
Repubilica Federativa do Brasil, Conqresso, Camara dos
Deputados, Commisao Parlamentar de Inquerito para investiqar o
comportimento e as influencias das empresas multinacionais e do
capital estrangeiro no Brasil , "Rela*b6ria e oonclusfles", Diario
do Congresso Nacional , (Secp'ao I - Suplemento) , Brasilia, 1 July'
1976; and Commisao Parlamentar de Inquerito destinada a evaluar a
politica mineral brasileira, ibid., 7 March 1978-
15
ibid., 1 July 1976, pp. 989-990. : •;,
16
Juvenil Tib6rcio Felix, "Ouro - urn bem mineral qt
confunde com a hist6ria do Brasi1. Os 150 anos da MineraqjSo Morro
Velhos estaqio atual e programa de expans&o em curso", Lecture
given to.the National Meeting on Mininq and Brazil 83, Instituto
Brasi leiro de Minerac'&o, 17 May 1983 (mimeo) . i
17
"Mario Henrique Simonsen", Optima, 30 C D , 31 July 1981,
pp.54-55.
ia
Prof Mauricio Traqtenberq, writinq in Noticlas Populares,
Sao Paulo, 8 September 1982.
19
Interviews conducted in Nova Lima, 24 June 1983.
20
See Alosio Biondi in Folha de S. Paulo, 15 May 1983, and
Edson Suszozynski in Jornal do Comercio, 21 May 1983.
21
Tecnologia e Defesa, 3, Sao Paulo, May 1983, pp. 15—17.
22
Istoe, 1 February 1984, pq- 57.
23
See DFEM/PROSIG, labela 5: Grupos empresariais que detem
maior n° de diplomas leqais, 10 August 1982, reprinted in
Minerioss extracao e processamento, February 1983, pq. 38.
24
On the col lapse of the Namibian f ishinq resource see
Richard Moorsom' s impressive study in the series "A future for
Namibia", Exploitinq the sea, London; Catholic Institute for
International Relations, 1984, especially pp. 16-50,
25
See Finance and Trade Review 5 C2), Pretoria, June 1962.
26 Interview with fishinq company accountant. Cape Town, 21
December 1983.
For Chile's economic policies at this time, which
emphasised an open door to foreign capital, see Phil O'Brien and
Jackie Roddick, Chile: the Pinochet decade - The rise and fall of
the Chicago boys, London: Latin America Bureau, 1983.
27
David Fiq, "Chile gets the full treatment". Third World
24
Review, The Guardian, London, 17 June 1981.
28
Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton, "The mi 1itary aspects of
national security", in Michael H H Louw,(ed), National security:
a modern approach, papers presented at the Symposium on National
Security, Pretoria, 31 March—i Apri1 1977, Pretoria: Institute of
Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria, 1978, pp. 100-
121. Dutton's term of of fice in Santiago ended in March 1984.
29
See International Institute for Strateqic Studies,
Military balanoe, 1981-82, London: IISS, 1982, pg. 94.
30
Armed Forces, Johannesburg, June 1981, pp. 17-20.
31 S A Shipping News & Fishing Industry Review, 36 ,
August 1982, pp. 26-27. I am grateful to the editor, Michael
Stuttaford, for his assistance.
Also see Financial Mail, 18 May 1984, pg. 37, which is
pessimistic about this venture being profitable before 1985.
32
Oceana Annual Report 1983, pg. 7; Financial Mail, IQC_..
33
Moorsom, Exploiting the sea, pq. 58. These estimates are
calculated for the year 1982, and the total is likely to have
risen substantally since then.
34
Interviews with the director and staff of the Fishing
Industry Research Institute, Cape Town, December 1983.
35
See Third World Review, The Guardian, London, 25 January
1983.
36
See Graciela Cpsvalente Viriarte, Desarollo capitalista de
la industria conservera en Chimbote: sus repercusiones sociales,
Chimbote, 1982, and various other publications of the Institute
de Prcmoci6n de Educaci6n Popular, Chimbote.
g
State/Tirrttoryboundary
Bra Til
300 400 600 tOO 1000
400
i
600 1200 HQO
Amgatia. •
MA7OGR0SSO /
t
CEKTHEWEST
DEjANStR.0
SOUTHEAST
ATLANTfC OCEAN
Maps by Michael Green
O tm*n*lCapt*t me*** bmraatis
• RtfiafUJCW*^ " "
Kiimtmsi- I | t -t—|
r • line* «» «Je ri»
^PARAGUAY
